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Analogy, the comparison of one set of relations to another, was essential to Humphry 
Davy’s understanding of chemistry. Throughout his career, Davy used analogical 
reasoning to direct and to interpret his experimental analyses of the chemical reactions 
between substances. In his writing, he deployed analogies to organise and to explain 
his theories about the relations between physical processes and between the properties 
of different chemical elements and compounds. But Davy also regularly expressed 
two concerns about analogical comparison: first, that it was founded not on the 
rational interpretation of facts but on imaginative speculation; and second, that it was 
a kind of rhetoric, the persuasiveness of which depended not on material evidence but 
on misleading figures of speech. This article discusses the influences that informed 
Davy’s ambivalent assessment of the value of analogy, and it examines the distinct 
yet overlapping ways in which this assessment was expressed in his notebooks, his 
lectures and treatises on chemistry, his philosophical writings, and his poetry. 
 
Humphry Davy’s views on analogy are summarised in a notebook that he used at the start of 
his career, in or before 1800. In some “Observations Relating to Existence,” one of several 
fragmentary essays written in the notebook, Davy announces that: 
All that we can hope for in physical & metaphysical science ie the science of nature & 
man is the discovery of new facts & of new expressions of old facts.—By means of 
our immensely powerful instrument of language we are capable not only of reasoning 
upon known & common things but likewise by making use of analogies & the 
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analytical method of reasoning upon unknown things the data being known things—it 
is from the extension of this reasoning to too great an extent that absurd & ridiculous 
systems of all kinds have been formed.1 
The conjunction of analytical reasoning and analogical thinking, Davy claims, is the basis not 
just of chemistry but of “science” in its broadest sense, the investigation of “nature & man” 
which uses “known things” to theorise, discover, and verify “unknown things.” But he also 
places limits on the legitimate scope of scientific knowledge, warning that, if pushed “to too 
great an extent,” this mode of enquiry results not in “new facts” but in “absurd & ridiculous 
systems,” theories with no concrete foundation. He voices a similar reservation, about 
analogical thinking specifically, in his “Elucidations of Speculative Philosophy” in the same 
notebook: “The man of Genius must be acquainted with human nature & his acquaintance 
must be founded not upon bare analogy; but upon an accurate observation of men.”2 
 Analogies differ from other kinds of comparison because they identify 
correspondences not between things themselves but between their respective relations to their 
constituent parts, to their characteristics, or to other things. Analogy was a key part of the 
intellectual framework of Davy’s chemistry, helping him to classify elements and compounds 
on the basis of similarities between their properties and between their interactions with other 
substances in chemical reactions. Sharon Ruston rightly points out that Davy considered 
analogy to be a “high-level thought process,” and that it was vital to his understanding and 
presentation of himself as a “man of Genius” and philosopher: 
Analogy was very much part of the perspective of his “true” philosopher: his world 
view was all-encompassing; analogy helped him to see the relations between the parts 
of the whole. It was very important to Davy that he not be thought of as narrow in his 
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purview; he saw beyond the individual experiments in the laboratory to contemplate 
how they revealed the patterns in the whole world.3 
Davy consistently used analogical thinking to identify and explain the dynamic yet uniform 
patterns and processes that determined the chemical transformations of matter and that, in his 
view, constituted the physical universe. But the aim of this article is to show that, while he 
relied on analogy, he was also troubled, throughout his career, by the doubts about its 
scientific validity which he expressed in his notebook. As well as signifying a 
correspondence between physical processes in the external world, the word “analogy” also 
denotes a comparative mode of reasoning and a figure of speech, and Davy was vexed by the 
uncertain relation between these different meanings. Analogies founded on facts were, for 
him, one of the bases of scientific knowledge, but the boundary between these legitimate 
analogies on the one hand, and analogies founded on nothing more than subjective 
speculation or linguistic metaphor on the other, was difficult to maintain.  
 Davy’s problem of analogy was a particular example of the wider problem of 
induction that haunted eighteenth and nineteenth-century thinking about science. In his 
Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume put forward the sceptical argument that neither 
reason nor empirical evidence was a sufficient basis for inductive thought’s progression from 
known particulars to unknown generalities: 
Reason can never show us the connexion of one object with another, tho’ aided by 
experience, and the observation of their constant conjunction in all past instances. 
When the mind, therefore, passes from the idea or impression of one object to the idea 
or belief of another, it is not determin’d by reason, but by certain principles, which 
associate together the ideas of these objects, and unite them in the imagination.4 
                                               
3 Sharon Ruston, “Humphry Davy and Priority.” 
4 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, eds. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 64. 
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The extent of Davy’s direct knowledge of Hume is uncertain, although John Davy, in his 
Memoirs of the Life of Sir Humphry Davy, mentions his brother’s youthful “acquaintance 
with the writings of all the more distinguished metaphysicians of modern times, as Locke, 
Hartley, Bishop Berkeley, Hume.”5 And, in an 1801 letter to Davy, the poet Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge refers to Hume in an offhand way that suggests a shared familiarity with the 
philosopher’s arguments.6 For Davy, the use of analogies to identify relations between 
objects was an exemplary instance of the inductive theorising on which chemistry depended, 
and his ambivalence towards analogy was rooted in the same unresolved questions that were 
raised by Hume’s definition of induction. To what extent was inductive thinking an 
imaginative rather than a rational process? And could the exercise of the subjective 
imagination play any legitimate part in the experimental and theoretical methods of the 
sciences? 
 The urgency of these questions was sharpened, in Davy’s case, by the difficulties 
involved in pursuing a career in chemistry at the start of the nineteenth century. In the view of 
Jan Golinski, Davy “was not a ‘professional scientist.’”7 No such figure existed at the time; 
therefore, Golinski proposes, Davy had to construct his identity (or identities) for himself: he 
“was a self-made man—so much so that there was considerable puzzlement among his 
contemporaries as to what sort of person he actually was.” His career can be understood as a 
series of intellectual and social performances through which he fashioned a variety of distinct 
yet overlapping personae. “He called himself a chemist, a philosopher, and a poet; but each of 
these terms had different connotations, and the combination of them in one individual was 
                                               
5 John Davy, Memoirs of the Life of Sir Humphry Davy, in The Collected Works of Sir Humphry Davy, ed. John 
Davy, 9 vols. (London: Smith, Elder, 1839-40), 1: 28. 
6 Samuel Taylor Coleridge to Davy, 3 February 1801, in Collected Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. Earl 
Leslie Griggs, 6 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966-71), 2: 672.  
7 Jan Golinski, The Experimental Self: Humphry Davy and the Making of a Man of Science (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2016), 3. 
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unique.”8 My argument in this article is that Davy’s identities were informed by different 
styles of thought and expression, and that his views on analogy were shaped by a tension 
between those styles. On the one hand, his self-identification as a philosopher and a poet 
validated (to use the words of his early notebook) his interest in “metaphysical science” and 
his reliance on the “immensely powerful instrument of language.” Imaginative analogies 
occupied an uncontentious place in philosophical and poetic thought. On the other hand, 
although Davy was not a professional scientist, he nonetheless subscribed to the methods of 
observational precision, objective description, and experimental verification which were 
emerging as the standardised conventions of scientific research in the early nineteenth 
century, and in which the status of analogical thinking was less secure. 
However, it is important to emphasise that Davy’s identities, and the modes of 
knowledge which they practised, were not rigidly segregated. He did not consider poetry and 
chemistry, for instance, to be straightforwardly opposed to each other. Dahlia Porter has 
argued that the young Davy, together with poets such as Coleridge and William Wordsworth, 
promoted a specifically Romantic definition of induction: they understood knowledge not as 
the classification of empirical data but as the work of “an active imagination,” which linked 
facts together through analogy and which aspired to a “goal of synthetic unity.”9 This 
“science of relations” promised to explain and demonstrate both the metaphysical unity 
championed in Romantic verse and the unity of nature as revealed by the physical sciences.10 
In contrast to Porter, I think that Davy retained his interest in this synthetic understanding of 
analogy throughout his career; it was not confined to his early writings. But it was 
consistently checked by his suspicion that the speculative and rhetorical licence afforded by 
analogy might exceed the bounds of legitimate theorising. This ambivalent view of analogy is 
                                               
8 Golinski, The Experimental Self, 2. 
9 Dahlia Porter, Science, Form, and the Problem of Induction in British Romanticism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2018), 45. 
10 Porter, Science, Form, and the Problem of Induction in British Romanticism, 46. 
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traceable throughout his diverse writings, from his lectures at the Royal Institution and his 
chemical treatises to his poems and philosophical dialogues. 
 The overlaps and tensions between Davy’s different identities are concisely set out in 
a short essay on the “Parallels between Art and Science” which he published in 1807. The 
essay’s argument hinges on an “analogy” between “the truths of the natural sciences” and 
“the productions of the refined arts.”11 In both, Davy claims, “imagination, as well as reason, 
is necessary to perfection in the philosophical mind. A rapidity of combination, a power of 
perceiving analogies, and of comparing them by facts, is the creative source of discovery.” 
The methods of art and science are comparable insofar as both rely on a negotiation between 
analogical thinking and factual evidence, and between imagination and reason. But Davy also 
distinguishes science from art, and specifically from poetry, asserting that “words are mutable 
and fleeting; and the genius of poetry is often dissipated in translation,” and that, in contrast, 
“nature cannot decay: the language of her interpreters will be the same in all times. It will be 
an universal tongue, speaking to all countries, and all ages, the excellence of the work, and 
the wisdom of the Creator.”12 Although Davy wrote poems throughout his life, here he 
expresses a firm preference for the factual discoveries of the natural sciences, which offer a 
direct interpretation of the realities of the external world, ahead of the verbal and figurative 
productions of poetry. Insisting on a distinction as well as a parallel between poetry and 
science, this essay puts forward an opposition, between the permanent facts of nature and the 
unreliable significations of words, that recurs throughout Davy’s writings on analogy. 
 
Analogy in Eighteenth and Nineteenth-Century Science 
 
                                               
11 Davy, “Parallels between Art and Science,” in The Collected Works of Sir Humphry Davy, 8: 307. 
12 Davy, “Parallels between Art and Science,” 308. 
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Before discussing Davy’s writings in detail, I will briefly consider the place of analogical 
thinking in British science more widely. Analogy has recently emerged as a prominent topic 
in scholarship on the history of science and on Romantic and Victorian literature, with 
researchers emphasising the way in which its epistemological ambiguity—its status as 
simultaneously factual, imaginative, and linguistic—acted as a bridge between different 
aspects of nineteenth-century British culture. In Darwin’s Plots, her influential study of the 
narrative structures of Victorian evolutionary theory, Gillian Beer posits that analogy consists 
in “ranging two patterns of experience alongside each other, seeking their points of identity, 
and then using one pattern to extend the other.” She comments that “there is always a sense 
of story—of sequence—in analogy, in a way that there need not be in other forms of 
metaphor,” and that it is therefore particularly well-suited to articulating the historical 
narratives of variation and transformation on which Darwinian evolution depends.13 Devin 
Griffiths repeats this claim, arguing that, in nineteenth-century Britain, analogy was more 
important to the “‘descriptive’ sciences” of geology and evolution, “which relied on 
description and imagination to elucidate natural pattern,” than it was to experimental sciences 
such as chemistry.14 But the distinction between experiment and description was not as 
straightforward as this implies. Tim Fulford points out that, despite Davy’s intermittent 
expressions of doubt about the reliability of words, his explanations of his experiments and 
theories are a form of narrative, which frequently rely on the rhetorical and figurative modes 
of language typically associated with literary writing.15 
  According to Kevin Lambert, the analogical identification of patterns and relations 
between natural phenomena was vital not just to evolutionary biology but also to the physical 
                                               
13 Gillian Beer, Darwin’s Plots: Evolutionary Narrative in Darwin, George Eliot, and Nineteenth-Century 
Fiction, 3rd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 74; Beer’s italics. 
14 Devin Griffiths, The Age of Analogy: Science and Literature between the Darwins (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2016), 11. 
15 Tim Fulford, “Science and Poetry in 1790s Somerset: The Self-Experiment Narrative, the Aeriform Effusion, 
and the Greater Romantic Lyric,” ELH 85 (2018): 85-117. 
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sciences in Victorian Britain. “In the second quarter of the nineteenth century,” he writes, 
“analogies were used to bring order to the natural and social worlds by maintaining a 
coherent and collective experience across cultural oppositions such as the ideal and material, 
the sacred and profane, theory and fact.”16 John Herschel’s theorisation of physical science in 
his 1830 Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy exemplifies this belief in 
analogical order and coherence. Herschel characterises the similarities between the 
phenomena of magnetism and those of electricity as instances of “those general analogies and 
parallels between great branches of science by which one strongly reminds us of another, 
though no direct connection appears;” such analogies are an “indication not to be neglected of 
a community of origin.”17 Correspondence of pattern, for Herschel as for several other 
nineteenth-century science writers, indicates “community of origin,” by which he means both 
a single physical process underpinning the phenomena and a shared origin in the providential 
wisdom of the Christian God. But this linking of the physical with the spiritual was not an 
innovation of the second quarter of the century; Davy often deployed analogy, in a similar 
way, to elucidate connections between natural processes and divine causes. In his “Parallels 
between Art and Science,” for example, he sets out a natural theological analogy between 
“the excellence of the work, and the wisdom of the Creator.” 
 Natural theology, and its endorsement of Christian faith, was an important aspect of 
the rhetoric of Davy’s later writings. In the early stages of his career, however, his views on 
analogy were shaped by the more philosophically and politically radical thinking of Thomas 
Beddoes, the physician who, in 1798, employed the nineteen-year-old Davy at his Pneumatic 
Institution in Bristol to investigate the possible medical benefits of gases such as nitrous 
                                               
16 Kevin Lambert, “The Uses of Analogy: James Clerk Maxwell’s ‘On Faraday’s Lines of Force’ and Early 
Victorian Analogical Argument,” British Journal for the History of Science 44 (2011): 61-2. 
17 John Herschel, A Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy (London: Longman, Rees, Orme, 
Brown, and Green, 1830), 340. 
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oxide. Beddoes was convinced of the importance of imagination in the development of new 
medical treatments:  
The imagination, I presume, may very allowably range the unexplored recesses of 
Nature in quest of remedies for frequent and fatal disorders. If any thing that appears 
capable of supplying so great a desideratum should occur, you must of necessity, in 
applying it to use, be guided by views or expectations, previous to direct experience. 
To frame analogical hypotheses concerning the operation of untried agents (unless the 
hypotheses be absurd or contrary to well-established facts) can, therefore, bring no 
man’s judgment into question.18 
Echoing Hume, Beddoes argues that “direct experience” is an insufficient basis for the 
framing of inductive hypotheses. Instead, such hypotheses rely of necessity on the elaboration 
of analogies that are to some extent speculative. But Beddoes also acknowledges that these 
analogies must be verified by experience, and particularly by the controlled manipulation of 
experience that constitutes scientific experiment. Hypotheses cannot be “contrary to well-
established facts,” and “to adhere to speculation in opposition to the evidence of experiment 
is, I acknowledge, a degree of weakness, equal to the criminality of prevarication or direct 
falsehood.”19  Mary Fairclough has suggested that “Beddoes roots his account” of the 
imagination, of which analogy was a key part, in a “materialist approach to enquiry” that was 
quickly repudiated by Davy, who in contrast defined the imagination as “transcendent,” 
“unearthly,” and “eternal.”20 After his move in 1801 to the Royal Institution in London, 
where his work was guided by the conservative political attitudes of the aristocrats who 
managed and patronised the institution, Davy unequivocally distanced himself from 
Beddoes’s radicalism and scientific materialism. However, there was nonetheless an 
                                               
18 Thomas Beddoes and James Watt, Considerations on the Medicinal Use and on the Production of Factitious 
Airs, 2nd edn (London: J. Johnson, 1795), 8. 
19 Beddoes, Considerations on the Medicinal Use and on the Production of Factitious Airs, 9. 
20 Mary Fairclough, “Dr Thomas Beddoes and the Politics of the Imagination,” Journal for Eighteenth-Century 
Studies 37 (2014): 83. 
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important similarity between their understandings of the imagination. Both for Beddoes and 
for Davy, the imaginative construction of analogies was an essential step in the 
epistemological transition from particular experimental facts to comprehensive scientific 
theories. 
 Another, less direct, influence was the poet and natural philosopher Erasmus Darwin, 
whose writings Davy knew through Beddoes and through Coleridge.21 Darwin’s integration 
of scientific argument with poetic expression became discredited in the years after his death 
in 1802, as the trend towards intellectual and disciplinary specialisation in nineteenth-century 
Britain undermined the legitimacy of this sort of generic admixture. Davy’s comments on 
him were often sceptical; as early as 1799, he wrote that “Darwin’s Theories seem to be daily 
loosing [sic] ground.”22 But the two writers shared a concern with the relations between 
different kinds of analogy. In the Advertisement to his 1791 poem The Botanic Garden, 
Darwin announces that “the general design of the following sheets is to inlist Imagination 
under the banner of Science; and to lead her votaries from the looser analogies, which dress 
out the imagery of poetry, to the stricter ones, which form the ratiocination of philosophy.”23 
Like Davy, Darwin distinguishes between the imprecise analogies of poetic imagery and the 
rigorous analogical reasoning of natural philosophy or physical science. But while Davy 
worries that the opposition between the two may be irreconcilable, Darwin confidently 
asserts that the figurative and imaginative analogies of poetry can operate as a form of 
science communication, helping to acquaint readers with the precise comparisons that 
underpin the theories of science, specifically, in the case of this poem, the Linnaean system of 
botanical taxonomy. 
                                               
21 See Martin Priestman, The Poetry of Erasmus Darwin: Enlightened Spaces, Romantic Times (Farnham: 
Ashgate, 2013), 15. 
22 Davy to Henry Penneck, 26 January 1799, http://www.davy-letters.org.uk (accessed 16 November 2018). This 
website will be superseded by The Collected Letters of Sir Humphry Davy, eds. Tim Fulford and Sharon Ruston, 
4 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). 
23 Erasmus Darwin, The Botanic Garden (London: J. Johnson, 1791), v. 
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 “In the last year of his life,” according to his brother, Davy characterised Darwin and 
Beddoes as essentially literary thinkers: Beddoes had a “wild and active imagination, which 
was as poetical as Darwin’s.” 24  This implies a distinction between the speculative 
imagination and the (presumably more measured) kind of inductive reasoning that informed 
Davy’s investigations of chemistry. But Beddoes and Darwin identified analogy as both an 
imaginative process and an instrument of science, a view that was influenced by their 
knowledge of the associationist philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment, to which they were 
introduced while studying medicine at the University of Edinburgh in the second half of the 
eighteenth century.25 In its scepticism towards a priori ideas and its definition of knowledge 
as the product of experience, associationism was an important intellectual support for the 
inductive and experimental protocols of science as they were codified over the course of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. For the associationists, analogy was one of the key 
methods through which the mind progressed from the observation of particular facts to the 
formation of general propositions, and the emphasis on analogy’s importance to scientific 
theorising in the work of Darwin, Beddoes, Davy, and numerous Victorian scientists is 
founded in part on the prominence of analogical thinking in associationist philosophy of mind. 
Hume, for instance, despite his denial of the rationality of induction, insists in his 
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding that the development of analogies based on 
experience is the root of knowledge of the external world: “All our reasonings concerning 
matter of fact are founded on a species of ANALOGY, which leads us to expect from any cause 
the same events, which we have observed to result from similar causes.”26 Hume emphasises 
the point, which is of crucial significance to scientific analogy and especially to the analogies 
                                               
24 Quoted in John Davy, Memoirs of the Life of Sir Humphry Davy, 49. 
25 See Fairclough, “Dr Thomas Beddoes and the Politics of the Imagination,” 81; and Priestman, The Poetry of 
Erasmus Darwin, 13. 
26 Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter Millican (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), 76. 
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of Davy’s chemistry, that this kind of inductive thinking depends on the observation of a 
range of similar objects, events, and patterns of cause and effect: 
It is only when two species of objects are found to be constantly conjoined, that we 
can infer the one from the other; and were an effect presented, which was entirely 
singular, and could not be comprehended under any known species, I do not see, that 
we could form any conjecture or inference at all concerning its cause. If experience 
and observation and analogy be, indeed, the only guides which we can reasonably 
follow in inferences of this nature; both the effect and the cause must bear a similarity 
and resemblance to other effects and causes, which we know, and which we have 
found, in many instances, to be conjoined with each other.27 
The mental principle of association groups the findings of “experience and observation” into 
“species of objects” by identifying them as effects of particular causes. Analogy, Hume 
suggests, constitutes a higher-level elaboration of this process: it links together species of 
objects, and their causal relations, on the basis of their similarity, and therefore enables the 
mind to identify patterns in the external world. This account was influential in nineteenth-
century definitions of science as the study of the dynamic processes of nature, and it also 
legitimised the extension of analogies beyond the apparent limits of the natural sciences, as 
writers traced correspondences between scientific theories and metaphysical, sociopolitical, 
or aesthetic beliefs. To the extent that Davy’s writings promote a view of analogy as an agent 
of epistemological synthesis and an expression of ontological unity, they build not just on 
Romantic theories of the imagination, but also on the associationist model of induction that 
informed his understanding of the scientific method. 
 
Analogy in Davy’s Chemistry 
                                               
27 Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 107-8; Hume’s italics. 
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Davy frequently reinvented himself over the course of his career: his philosophical and 
religious beliefs, his political opinions, and his self-definition altered as he aged and as he 
moved between different institutional and intellectual contexts. But his conviction of the 
importance of analogy to chemistry was strikingly consistent. Throughout his science 
writings, it is one of the most prominent means through he organises and explains his 
experimental findings and his theoretical arguments. The adjective “analogous” is a keyword 
in his 1800 Researches, Chemical and Philosophical, Chiefly Concerning Nitrous Oxide; in 
his 1802 Syllabus of a Course of Lectures on Chemistry, Delivered at the Royal Institution of 
Great Britain; and in his 1812 Elements of Chemical Philosophy. He employs the word to 
identify correspondences between a diverse range of data: chemical reactions; the sensations 
prompted by nitrous oxide and other intoxicants;28 the “physical properties” of groups of 
elements and compounds;29 the general “laws” of chemistry and physics; and the phenomena 
of physical processes such as electricity and magnetism.30 In each case, Davy’s use of the 
word indicates that the most accurate way to describe and classify a set of processes, 
substances, or laws is to identify them as analogous to known equivalents. 
 However, Davy’s ambivalence towards analogy was equally consistent. On the first 
page of the Syllabus of his 1802 course of lectures at the Royal Institution, he asserts that “the 
sciences are classes of different facts associated together by analogy,” and that “the theories 
which represent them are connected propositions, in which, by means of that faculty of the 
mind named abstraction, one term is made to represent a number of other terms, which 
themselves stand for ideas.”31 He identifies scientific theorising as an inductive process that 
                                               
28 Davy, Researches, Chemical and Philosophical, Chiefly Concerning Nitrous Oxide, in The Collected Works 
of Sir Humphry Davy, 3: 96 and 271. 
29 Davy, A Syllabus of a Course of Lectures on Chemistry, Delivered at the Royal Institution of Great Britain, in 
The Collected Works of Sir Humphry Davy, 2: 354. 
30 Davy, Elements of Chemical Philosophy, in The Collected Works of Sir Humphry Davy, 4: 37 and 124. 
31 Davy, A Syllabus of a Course of Lectures on Chemistry, 329. 
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operates on empirical facts which are “associated together by analogy;” the resulting ideas 
are then arranged, represented, and communicated through linguistic terms and propositions. 
Analogical comparison is essential to the sciences’ elaboration of theories from facts. Yet in 
the Advertisement which is prefixed to the Syllabus, Davy places fact and analogy in 
opposition to each other, commenting that “the classification of substances adopted” in his 
lectures “is founded rather upon facts than analogies; and in consequence, certain bodies have 
been placed amongst the simple principles, which, from their resemblance to other bodies of 
known composition, have been generally arranged in the class of compounds.”32 Davy here 
imposes a limit on the scientific value of analogy. The resemblance between the bodies in 
question and other known compounds is not a sufficient basis for their classification; instead, 
their place in his system is determined by the fact that they have not yet been experimentally 
decompounded, and therefore appear to be elements or “simple principles.” 
 The first of Davy’s 1802 lectures, “A Discourse Introductory to a Course of Lectures 
on Chemistry,” puts forward a sweeping narrative of intellectual progress, celebrating not just 
chemistry but natural science in general as a form of knowledge that is at the same time 
epistemologically precise, aesthetically pleasing, practically useful, and socially respectable. 
Davy’s considerations of the different branches of science in this discourse, and of their 
respective degrees of rigour and utility, frequently depend on assessments of the kinds of 
analogy employed by them. He claims, for example, that, without the aid of chemical analysis, 
“the mind of the mineralogist” is baffled and “perplexed by endeavours to discover the loose 
and varying analogies between the colours, the shapes, and the weights of different 
substances.” Davy judges analogies by their results: the mineralogist’s analogical 
comparisons of colours, shapes, and weights are “loose” because they fail to reveal the sort of 
consistent or coherent patterns that might inform the classification of minerals or the 
                                               
32 Davy, A Syllabus of a Course of Lectures on Chemistry, 328. 
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explanation of their composition and origin. In contrast, he tells his audience, “medicine and 
physiology” have “derived from chemistry most of their practical applications, and many of 
the analogies which have contributed to give to their scattered facts order and systematic 
arrangement.”33 But he also cautions that some physiological researchers have been carried 
away by the ambition of their theoretical systems: 
Speculative philosophers have been guided rather by the analogies of words than of 
facts. Instead of slowly endeavouring to lift up the veil concealing the wonderful 
phænomena of living nature; full of ardent imaginations, they have vainly and 
presumptuously attempted to tear it asunder.34 
As Kurtis Hessel points out, “because they sought to transmit unfamiliar ideas via familiar 
analogues, Davy’s lectures embraced figural language” such as the conventional (and 
arguably clichéd) metaphor of the veil hiding the face of nature.35 Davy reworks this 
metaphor as an analogy: precise and rigorous investigation effects the slow lifting up of this 
veil, while speculative theorising tries in vain to “tear it asunder.” The gendered dynamic of 
the veil metaphor, in which the man of science reveals the secrets of a feminised nature, 
means that the analogy carries with it connotations of sexual violence; it supports Davy’s 
broader argument for the social respectability of natural science by suggesting that 
speculative philosophy, in contrast, is morally as well as intellectually dangerous.36 Davy’s 
rhetorical device encapsulates some of the ambiguities in his understanding of analogy, as he 
uses an analogical figure of speech to criticise linguistic analogies, and to insist that 
                                               
33 Davy, “A Discourse Introductory to a Course of Lectures on Chemistry,” in The Collected Works of Sir 
Humphry Davy, 2: 313 
34 Davy, “A Discourse Introductory to a Course of Lectures on Chemistry,” 314. 
35Kurtis Hessel, “The Romantic-Era Lecture: Dividing and Reuniting the Arts and Sciences,” Configurations 24 
(2016): 515.  
36 For a discussion of the sexual politics of the veil metaphor, see Ludmilla Jordanova, Sexual Visions: Images 
of Gender in Science and Medicine between the Eighteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1989), 87-110. 
 16 
legitimate scientific knowledge must be founded not on words but on the analogical 
connection of empirical facts. 
 Davy reiterates his opposition between linguistic imagination and scientific rigour in 
the peroration to his discourse, but again there are tensions within the language that he uses to 
articulate this opposition. He extols science’s preference for “things” ahead of “words,” but 
he also uses that preference to support his claim that scientific study can lead to knowledge of 
questions with no direct link to the material things and physical processes of nature: 
The man who has been accustomed to study natural objects philosophically, to be 
perpetually guarding against the delusions of the fancy, will not readily be induced to 
multiply words so as to forget things. From observing in the relations of inanimate 
things fitness and utility, he will reason with deeper reverence concerning beings 
possessing life; and perceiving in all the phenomena of the universe the designs of a 
perfect intelligence, he will be averse to the turbulence and passion of hasty 
innovations, and will uniformly appear as the friend of tranquillity and order.37 
These sentences set out a defence of natural theology and political conservatism which hinges 
on a series of associations so loose that they arguably do not qualify as analogies. The first is 
between “inanimate things” and “beings possessing life.” Davy does not elaborate on the 
details of the correspondence between these two groups, but his argument is evidently that 
the “fitness and utility” of both embody “the designs of a perfect intelligence” and 
demonstrate the providential order of the physical universe. He then, in a second submerged 
analogy, implies an equivalence between this order and the “tranquillity and order” that 
characterise the proper conduct of political and social life. Andrea Henderson has argued that, 
in the work of Victorian physicists, analogy is presented as an “equalizing” mode of thought, 
which defines physical phenomena such as electricity and magnetism “in terms of reciprocal 
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tensions and mutually sustained energies rather than the dominating power of discrete 
agents,” and which is therefore “in striking conformity” with the “reformist political 
ideology” that was widely influential in Victorian Britain. 38  Davy here illustrates 
Henderson’s general argument that scientific analogy is often also political. However, he uses 
the analogy between political relations and the “relations of inanimate things” to promote a 
hierarchical (rather than equalising) model of nature and society, endorsing the reactionary 
conservatism, and suspicion of “hasty innovations,” that shaped the politics of the British 
establishment in the decades after the French Revolution. 
 The 1802 discourse sets a pattern for Davy’s handling of analogy that recurs 
throughout his writings. It claims that only analogies based on empirical facts are permissible 
in scientific theorising; it criticises analogies based on words rather than on facts; but it also 
uses both kinds of analogy, factual and figurative, to expand the remit of physical science 
beyond the empirical and to argue for correspondences between scientific knowledge and 
political and metaphysical beliefs. In the Elements of Chemical Philosophy, a text which aims 
to summarise the findings of his experiments and to set out a systematic classification of 
material substances based on those findings, Davy writes that:  
The foundations of chemical philosophy are, observation, experiment, and analogy. 
By observation, facts are distinctly and minutely impressed on the mind. By analogy, 
similar facts are connected. By experiment, new facts are discovered; and, in the 
progression of knowledge, observation, guided by analogy, leads to experiment, and 
analogy confirmed by experiment, becomes scientific truth.39 
Scientific method, in this formulation, commences with the observation of facts before 
proceeding to a sustained negotiation between analogy and experiment. Davy allows that 
speculative analogies play a part in this method. But the key distinction between “chemical 
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philosophy” and the sort of imaginative induction that, according to Hume, constitutes 
general knowledge is that the chemist’s hypothetical connections of facts are confirmed (or 
not) by the discovery of new and corroborative facts through the processes of experiment. In 
the historical survey of chemical knowledge that opens Elements of Chemical Philosophy, 
Davy utilises this model of scientific analogy to distinguish modern chemistry from pre-
Renaissance alchemy. The “vain imagination,” “wanderings of genius,” and abstruse 
“systems of logic” that shaped the theories of the alchemists, he asserts, “were founded rather 
upon the analogies of words than upon the relations of things; and they were more calculated 
to conceal error, than to discover truth.”40 
 The bulk of Elements of Chemical Philosophy consists of accounts of Davy’s 
experiments and explanations of his taxonomy of the different forms of matter. Most of the 
analogies put forward in the text are strictly chemical and material in scope; perhaps the most 
important is the claim that “as far as our knowledge of the nature of compound bodies has 
extended, analogy of properties is connected with analogy of composition,” which is arguably 
the foundational principle informing Davy’s research on the properties of and interactions 
between chemical substances.41 In keeping with his definition of chemistry as a mutually 
correcting exchange between analogical hypotheses and experimental tests, he acknowledges 
that his classification of substances is provisional, and he looks forward to a future in which 
chemical theories are more precise:  
It is contrary to the usual order of things, that events so harmonious as those of the 
system of the earth, should depend on such diversified agents, as are supposed to exist 
in our artificial arrangements; and there is reason to anticipate a great reduction in the 
number of the undecompounded bodies, and to expect that the analogies of nature will 
be found conformable to the refined operations of art. The more the phenomena of the 
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universe are studied, the more distinct their connection appears, the more simple their 
causes, the more magnificent their design, and the more wonderful the wisdom and 
power of their Author.42 
Here, again, Davy’s reasoning relies on a number of implicit and loose analogies. He posits a 
correspondence between “the usual order of things” (by which he means, apparently, the 
physical and metaphysical constitution of the universe as a whole) and the events of “the 
system of the earth,” the terrestrial processes studied in experimental chemistry. But there is a 
disanalogy between these harmonious processes and “our artificial arrangements.” In the 
future, he hopes, chemistry will be simplified through “a great reduction in the number of the 
undecompounded bodies,” substances whose chemical structures remain at present 
unresolved. This goal is to be attained, presumably, by the further framing and experimental 
testing of analogical hypotheses, and, when it is realised, “the analogies of nature will be 
found conformable” to the artificial analogies constructed through experiment. This 
conformity between science and nature is possible, Davy suggests in the final sentence, 
because the “phenomena of the universe”—both the physical phenomena of the external 
world and the mental phenomena of scientific theorising—are connected analogically through 
their shared causes, which can ultimately be reduced to a singular cause: “the wisdom and 
power of their Author.” 
 
Analogy in Davy’s Poetry and Speculative Philosophy 
 
Despite its technical focus, Elements of Chemical Philosophy finds room for analogical 
arguments about the metaphysical origins of chemical processes. This kind of analogy was a 
conventional feature of natural theology, but in some of his other writings Davy gives free 
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rein to more idiosyncratic speculations. Jan Golinski argues that there is “only a superficial 
kind of unity among Davy’s varied publications,” and that he utilises “the different textual 
genres” of his work to a develop a broad range of “authorial personae.”43 Consolations in 
Travel, written as Davy travelled through Europe in the late 1820s and published 
posthumously in 1830, supports this observation to an extent. The authorial persona presented 
in this series of philosophical dialogues is arguably that of a speculative philosopher rather 
than a specialist chemist; Davy’s aim is to integrate the most recent theories of the physical 
sciences with bold metaphysical conjectures. In the first dialogue his narrator meets with a 
supernatural entity, “the Genius,” who transports him to Saturn. His guide expresses 
sympathy with the narrator’s understandable bafflement at this turn of events, and at the alien 
landscapes and extraterrestrial beings to which he is introduced: “‘I know what your feelings 
are,’ said the Genius: ‘you want analogies and all the elements of knowledge to comprehend 
the scene before you.’”44 The inhabitants of Saturn are identified as more advanced than 
humanity, and the genius spends much of this dialogue trying to supply the narrator with 
analogies capable of illustrating their superiority: 
“As I cannot describe to you the organs of these wonderful beings, so neither can I 
show to you their modes of life; but as their highest pleasures depend upon 
intellectual pursuits, so you may conclude that those modes of life bear the strictest 
analogy to that which on the earth you would call exalted virtue.”45 
The Genius “cannot describe” the physical constitution of the beings because their organs 
comprise a form of matter which is unknowable through the human senses: “‘with higher 
natures, finer and more etherial kinds of matter are employed in organization, substances that 
bear the same analogy to common matter that the refined or most subtle gases do to common 
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solids and fluids.’”46 The Genius’s analogies convey both a moral comparison, between the 
beings’ habitual “mode of life” and the virtue rarely attained by humanity, and a material 
correspondence between the properties of the different forms of “common matter” and those 
of the ether, the hypothetical substance that, in the opinion of most nineteenth-century 
scientists, pervaded space and acted as the medium of the transmission of light and radiant 
heat. This ether, according to the Genius, might also provide a material form to “higher 
natures.” Scientific theory is enlisted here in the service of speculative fiction, via an analogy 
which has been severed from any foundation in observed fact. 
 This degree of imaginative freedom is not, however, maintained throughout 
Consolations in Travel as a whole. The Genius disappears after the first dialogue, and the 
second half of the text is dominated by the figure of the Unknown, a preternaturally wise 
chemist whom the narrator and his companions meet during their travels around Europe. The 
Unknown is sternly critical of overambitious analogies. Discussing the “new and 
extraordinary views in electricity” which have been recently revealed by “the progress of 
science” and “applied by speculative reasoners to solve some of the mysterious and recondite 
phenomena of organized being,” he cautions that “the analogy is too remote and incorrect; 
the sources of life cannot be grasped by such machinery; to look for them in the powers of 
electro-chemistry is seeking the living among the dead.”47 Davy himself was the most 
influential proponent of what the Unknown terms “electro-chemistry;” his experimental 
isolation of chemical elements frequently depended on the decomposition of compound 
substances by the electrical current of a voltaic battery. But, through the voice of the 
Unknown, Davy insists that there is no legitimate analogy between this process and the 
physiological processes that characterise “organized being.” He espouses a dualist separation 
of the properties of living things from those of “dead” matter, a distinction which rejects the 
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kind of analogy between material and vital phenomena put forward with such abandon in the 
first dialogue (and propounded, as well, in the peroration to his 1802 discourse). 
 Yet although the Unknown censures this “remote and incorrect” comparison, he is not 
hostile to scientific analogy in general. In the fifth dialogue he enumerates “the intellectual 
qualities necessary for discovery, or for the advancement of the science” of chemistry, 
advising, among other things, that “the imagination must be active and brilliant in seeking 
analogies; yet entirely under the influence of the judgment in applying them,” and that, “in 
detailing the results of experiments, and in giving them to the world, the chemical 
philosopher should adopt the simplest style and manner; he will avoid all ornaments, as 
something injurious to his subject.”48 The presence of such sentiments in a text written in the 
final year of Davy’s life demonstrates the consistency of his views on analogy. As in his 1802 
lectures and in the 1812 Elements of Chemical Philosophy, he assigns the analogical 
imagination a valid role in the methods of chemistry, while also insisting that hypothetical 
analogies must be carefully interrogated and that figures of speech such as rhetorical 
analogies are best avoided altogether. And his identification of scientific theorising as a 
collaboration between two mental faculties, a speculative imagination and a critical and 
rational judgment, recalls the comment, written in his notebook thirty years before, that 
science relies both on analogical thinking and on “the analytical method of reasoning.” 
 This balanced assessment of analogy, poised between appreciation of its explanatory 
power and concern about its imaginative and rhetorical excesses, is characteristic of most of 
Davy’s writings. But there are also examples in his work of an alternative, unequivocally 
critical, view. In another notebook which he used around 1800, Davy wrote: 
That Man must indeed be badly organized whom Nature is incapable of instructing. 
The Theorising habit in a sound mind can counteract for a short time only the love of 
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seeing things in their real light & the illusions of the imagination in proportion as they 
often occur & are destroyed by facts will become less vivid & less capable of 
permanently misleading the mind.—Perceptions will make themselves perceptible to 
the accurate observer, & unless the laws of human nature should undergo alterations 
the facts which form the basis of every science must be similarly discerned & 
similarly reasoned upon by men who are disenchanted with regard to every thing but 
fact.49 
“The feeling generally connected with new facts,” he concludes, enables the mind “to reason 
more rapidly upon them,” but it also encourages theorists “to perceive analogies where 
analogies to the sound mind do not exist.”50 Science is presented in this note as a factual and 
rational enterprise, the work of a “sound mind” that accurately observes and reasons on 
“things in their real light.” Davy’s opinion of imaginative theorising here is unambiguously 
negative: it yields nothing but “illusions” that mislead the mind, and his final sentence 
implies that analogies are chief among these illusions. More often than not, he suggests, the 
perception of analogies emerges not from facts themselves but from the tendency of the 
theorising mind, when contemplating facts, to be carried away by an irrational enthusiasm. 
 Davy reiterated this point a quarter of a century later, in a poem which he wrote in 
1827 in the Italian city of Ravenna and which was printed posthumously in John Davy’s 
Memoirs: 
In ignorance of all things we assume 
What reasonings most please us, and in things 
The most unlike in form as well as essence 
We trace analogies; as if it were 
A joy to blend all contrarieties, 
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———————And to discover 
In things the most unlike some qualities 
Having relationship and family ties.51 
The tracing of analogies is attributed in these lines to ignorant “reasonings” rather than to the 
imagination, but apart from this difference in language the poem’s argument is almost 
identical to that of Davy’s 1800 note. Analogies are founded not on objective facts or 
material things but on a feeling, a pleasing “joy,” that prompts the mind of the observer to 
contrive connections and to impose similarities on unlike things. This interpretation of 
analogy as a mental artifice throws doubt on the existence of real correspondences in the 
external world and on Davy’s claim in the Elements of Chemical Philosophy that “analogy of 
properties is connected with analogy of composition.” Davy’s science writing consistently 
indicates that chemistry as an intellectual discipline is directed by the assumption of the 
uniformity of natural processes. This poem, conversely, characterises the discovery of such 
uniformity as a projection of the mind, while emphasising, in contrast, the irreducible 
heterogeneity of nature. 
 The poem starts as an attack on analogy in general, but its disapproval promptly 
focuses, like that of the Unknown in Consolations in Travel, specifically on analogies 
between inanimate and living things. In another example of his distrust of comparisons based 
on words, Davy claims that the ignorance of analogical thinking is exemplified in a 
conventional but misleading figure of speech: 
Thus life we term a spark, a fire, a flame; 
And then we call that fire, that flame, immortal, 
Although the nature of all fiery things 
Belonging to the earth is perishable. 
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The lightning, in its fierceness and its power, 
Is of an instant only! 
The meteor’s blaze lightening the visible scene 
As transient is! 
And vainly should we search where these had been. 
The solar light, when the bright orb has sunk, 
Dwells not within known space; 
And that which kindleth the whole frame of nature 
Has no abiding place, although its source 
Is everlasting: it lives but to decay, 
And in its course a million miles are nothing; 
It passes from and through the infinite.52 
The problem here, it seems, is not with the metaphor which identifies life as a fire or flame, 
but with the analogy which erroneously attributes to living beings and “fiery things” the same 
property: immortality. The poem’s rejection of this claim, though, itself depends on a loose 
analogy between a group of phenomena that are arguably more dissimilar than similar: fire, 
lightning, the trajectory of a meteor, and the transmission of light from the sun and from stars 
across the universe (“that which kindleth the whole frame of nature”). The property which 
connects these phenomena, according to Davy, is their transience. Like his other writings, the 
poem depicts nature as dynamic and mutable, but whereas his writings on chemistry claim 
that this mutability can be reduced to a regular and quantifiable order, here it is instead 
indicative of impermanence and decay. This argument is also communicated in another kind 
of analogy, between Davy’s pessimistic interpretation of natural processes—and of the 
mind’s tendency to establish false analogies between them—and the fragmentary form of his 
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blank verse, which is frequently interrupted by half-finished lines. The lines of the poem are 
as “unlike in form” as its figures of speech are unlike in essence; both are haphazard and 
contingent. Although Davy identifies the source of light (and it is not clear whether he means 
a physical body or a metaphysical deity) as everlasting, the poem suggests that nothing else, 
either in nature or in language, is permanent. 
 In the final lines, however, he tries to console himself on this point by altering the 
terms of his argument: 
So is our life of thought: we look not back 
Beyond a few short hours,—a life, a day, 
An age; that period gone, we blend 
With future, and with past, eternity.53 
This anti-analogy poem ends with an analogy which is even more speculative than the one it 
has just rejected. It may be misleading to claim that inanimate and living things share the 
property of immortality, but in these lines Davy puts forward the same analogical claim about 
physical phenomena and “our life of thought.” He implies that, although natural processes 
and personal and historical memories appear to be transient, they similarly emerge from and 
are incorporated within something (presumably the divine) which transcends the limits of 
measurable space and time: spatial infinity is to light as temporal eternity is to thought.  
The contradictions in this argument can be read in biographical terms: Davy had been 
seriously ill for several months when he wrote the poem, and it is easy to see why he may 
have wanted to find a means of voicing both his fears and his hopes about immortality. 
However, the poem’s fluctuations are also expressive of a considered intellectual stance that 
informed his work throughout his career; it sets out a measured assessment of analogy which 
it shares with his writings on chemistry. For Davy, poetic expression and scientific theory 
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both depend on analogy in their elaboration of imaginative and synthetic links between 
physical phenomena and between the physical and the metaphysical. But the poem also 
restates Davy’s habitual warning about analogy’s tendency to exceed the facts of nature, to 
hypothesise figurative relations that cannot be verified. Davy tried throughout his career to 
police the boundary between factual and figurative analogies, but his work as a whole 
indicates that the epistemological value of analogy is inseparable from its speculative 
abandon. While Erasmus Darwin distinguished between the “looser analogies” of poetry and 
the “stricter ones” of natural philosophy, Davy’s diverse writings complicate this distinction 
by suggesting that poetic and scientific knowledge are each examples of an inductive method 
which is at the same time empirical and imaginative. 
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